Single Trace Side Channel Analysis on Quantum Key Distribution

Suhri Kim, Sunghyun Jin, Yechan Lee, Byeonggyu Park, Hanbit Kim, Seokhie Hong

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

The security of current key exchange protocols such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange is based on the hardness of number theoretic problems. However, these key exchange protocols are threatened by weak random number generators, advances to CPU power, a new attack from the eavesdropper, and the emergence of a quantum computer. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) addresses these challenges by using quantum properties to exchange a secret key without the risk of being intercepted. Recent developments on the QKD system resulted in a stable key generation with fewer errors so that the QKD system is rapidly becoming a solid commercial proposition. However, although the security of the QKD system is guaranteed by quantum physics, its careless implementation could make the system vulnerable. In this paper, we proposed the first side-channel attack on plug-and-play QKD system. Through a single electromagnetic trace obtained from the phase modulator on Alice's side, we were able to classify the electromagnetic trace into four classes, which corresponds to the number of bit and basis combination in the BB84 protocol. We concluded that the plug-and-play QKD system is vulnerable to side-channel attack so that the countermeasure must be considered.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication9th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence
Subtitle of host publicationICT Convergence Powered by Smart Intelligence, ICTC 2018
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages736-739
Number of pages4
ISBN (Electronic)9781538650400
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Nov 16
Event9th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence, ICTC 2018 - Jeju Island, Korea, Republic of
Duration: 2018 Oct 172018 Oct 19

Other

Other9th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence, ICTC 2018
CountryKorea, Republic of
CityJeju Island
Period18/10/1718/10/19

Fingerprint

Quantum cryptography
Network protocols
Quantum computers
Modulators
Program processors
Distribution system
Physics
Hardness
Attack

Keywords

  • EM analysis
  • plug-and-play
  • QKD
  • side-channel attack
  • Single Trace Attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Information Systems
  • Information Systems and Management
  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Kim, S., Jin, S., Lee, Y., Park, B., Kim, H., & Hong, S. (2018). Single Trace Side Channel Analysis on Quantum Key Distribution. In 9th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence: ICT Convergence Powered by Smart Intelligence, ICTC 2018 (pp. 736-739). [8539703] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICTC.2018.8539703

Single Trace Side Channel Analysis on Quantum Key Distribution. / Kim, Suhri; Jin, Sunghyun; Lee, Yechan; Park, Byeonggyu; Kim, Hanbit; Hong, Seokhie.

9th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence: ICT Convergence Powered by Smart Intelligence, ICTC 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. p. 736-739 8539703.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Kim, S, Jin, S, Lee, Y, Park, B, Kim, H & Hong, S 2018, Single Trace Side Channel Analysis on Quantum Key Distribution. in 9th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence: ICT Convergence Powered by Smart Intelligence, ICTC 2018., 8539703, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 736-739, 9th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence, ICTC 2018, Jeju Island, Korea, Republic of, 18/10/17. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICTC.2018.8539703
Kim S, Jin S, Lee Y, Park B, Kim H, Hong S. Single Trace Side Channel Analysis on Quantum Key Distribution. In 9th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence: ICT Convergence Powered by Smart Intelligence, ICTC 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2018. p. 736-739. 8539703 https://doi.org/10.1109/ICTC.2018.8539703
Kim, Suhri ; Jin, Sunghyun ; Lee, Yechan ; Park, Byeonggyu ; Kim, Hanbit ; Hong, Seokhie. / Single Trace Side Channel Analysis on Quantum Key Distribution. 9th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence: ICT Convergence Powered by Smart Intelligence, ICTC 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. pp. 736-739
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