Strategic analysis of influence peddling

Mukul Majumdar, Seung Han Yoo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyzes "influence peddling" in a model that portrays interactions involving human capital transfer and collusion-building, in which each government official regulates multiple firms simultaneously. We show that there exists a collusion maximizing equilibrium between a sequence of "qualified" regulators and a firm such that the qualified bureaucrat manipulates regulation rates for two firms by regulating the colluding firm leniently for the maximized sum of their payoffs, but regulating the non-colluding firm stringently for the signaling in order to "compensate" for the lenient regulatory stance taken toward the colluding firm.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)737-762
Number of pages26
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume41
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012 Dec 1

Fingerprint

firm
Collusion
Human Capital
capital movement
Regulator
human capital
Influence
Business
Strategic analysis
regulation
interaction
Interaction
Model

Keywords

  • Repeated games
  • Revolving doors
  • Signaling games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Cite this

Strategic analysis of influence peddling. / Majumdar, Mukul; Yoo, Seung Han.

In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 41, No. 4, 01.12.2012, p. 737-762.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Majumdar, Mukul ; Yoo, Seung Han. / Strategic analysis of influence peddling. In: International Journal of Game Theory. 2012 ; Vol. 41, No. 4. pp. 737-762.
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