Symmetric Equilibria in a Cost-Averting War of Attrition Requiring Minimum Necessary Conceders

Geofferey Jiyun Kim, Bara Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper provides an analysis of a cost-Averting war of attrition with minimum necessary conceders. All symmetric stationary Nash equilibria are characterized. The multiplicity of equilibria has called for further refinements. We show that there exists a unique symmetric stationary trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Comparative statics results of the trembling hand perfect equilibrium are provided. This paper's model is motivated by the problem of delayed public goods provisions in collective action settings. Augmenting the number of minimum necessary conceders can curtail delays.

Original languageEnglish
Article number20160109
JournalUnknown Journal
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2017 Sep 26

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Costs
Perfect equilibrium
War of attrition
Multiplicity
Nash equilibrium
Comparative statics
Collective action

Keywords

  • Bellman equation
  • Nash equilibrium
  • public economics
  • trembling hand perfection
  • war of attrition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Symmetric Equilibria in a Cost-Averting War of Attrition Requiring Minimum Necessary Conceders. / Kim, Geofferey Jiyun; Kim, Bara.

In: Unknown Journal, 26.09.2017.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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