Abstract
Is technology competition between commercial rivals an impediment to international co-operation? Or could it instead help states collaborate? Our game-theoretic model suggests that technology competition impedes international co-operation when states hold 'techno-nationalist' preferences but have starkly asymmetric abilities to capture new markets. States that expect to lose refuse to co-operate, so treaty formation fails. However, technology competition may also facilitate co-operation. While states invest in new technologies out of self-interest, doing so also reduces consumer prices for other states. Comparative case studies of environmental co-operation demonstrate the model's utility. For example, European co-operation on climate policy was easier to achieve because forerunner countries, such as Denmark and Germany, implemented industrial policies that enhanced the competitiveness of their renewable energy industries. This technology competition reduced the cost of renewable energy for other European countries, and thus lowered the economic costs of their emissions reductions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 545-574 |
| Number of pages | 30 |
| Journal | British Journal of Political Science |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 Jan 1 |
Fingerprint
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
Cite this
Technology competition and international co-operation : Friends or foes? / Kim, Sung Eun; Urpelainen, Johannes.
In: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 3, 01.01.2014, p. 545-574.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Technology competition and international co-operation
T2 - Friends or foes?
AU - Kim, Sung Eun
AU - Urpelainen, Johannes
PY - 2014/1/1
Y1 - 2014/1/1
N2 - Is technology competition between commercial rivals an impediment to international co-operation? Or could it instead help states collaborate? Our game-theoretic model suggests that technology competition impedes international co-operation when states hold 'techno-nationalist' preferences but have starkly asymmetric abilities to capture new markets. States that expect to lose refuse to co-operate, so treaty formation fails. However, technology competition may also facilitate co-operation. While states invest in new technologies out of self-interest, doing so also reduces consumer prices for other states. Comparative case studies of environmental co-operation demonstrate the model's utility. For example, European co-operation on climate policy was easier to achieve because forerunner countries, such as Denmark and Germany, implemented industrial policies that enhanced the competitiveness of their renewable energy industries. This technology competition reduced the cost of renewable energy for other European countries, and thus lowered the economic costs of their emissions reductions.
AB - Is technology competition between commercial rivals an impediment to international co-operation? Or could it instead help states collaborate? Our game-theoretic model suggests that technology competition impedes international co-operation when states hold 'techno-nationalist' preferences but have starkly asymmetric abilities to capture new markets. States that expect to lose refuse to co-operate, so treaty formation fails. However, technology competition may also facilitate co-operation. While states invest in new technologies out of self-interest, doing so also reduces consumer prices for other states. Comparative case studies of environmental co-operation demonstrate the model's utility. For example, European co-operation on climate policy was easier to achieve because forerunner countries, such as Denmark and Germany, implemented industrial policies that enhanced the competitiveness of their renewable energy industries. This technology competition reduced the cost of renewable energy for other European countries, and thus lowered the economic costs of their emissions reductions.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84902136138&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84902136138&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S0007123412000762
DO - 10.1017/S0007123412000762
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84902136138
VL - 44
SP - 545
EP - 574
JO - British Journal of Political Science
JF - British Journal of Political Science
SN - 0007-1234
IS - 3
ER -