The effective minimax value of asynchronously repeated games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the effect of asynchronous choice structure on the possibility of cooperation in repeated strategic situations. We model the strategic situations as asynchronously repeated games, and define two notions of effective minimax value. We show that the order of players' moves generally affects the effective minimax value of the asynchronously repeated game in significant ways, but the order of moves becomes irrelevant when the stage game satisfies the non-equivalent utilities (NEU) condition. We then prove the Folk Theorem that a payoff vector can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome with correlation device if and only if it dominates the effective minimax value. These results, in particular, imply both Lagunoff and Matsui's (1997) result and Yoon (2001)'s result on asynchronously repeated games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)431-442
Number of pages12
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume32
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2003 Aug 1

Fingerprint

Repeated Games
Minimax
Folk Theorem
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Values
Game
If and only if
Imply
Repeated games
Model

Keywords

  • Asynchronously repeated games
  • Effective minimax value
  • Folk theorem

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Cite this

The effective minimax value of asynchronously repeated games. / Yoon, Kiho.

In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 32, No. 4, 01.08.2003, p. 431-442.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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