The gatekeeper's optimal fee structure when sellers can price discriminate

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article investigates a monopoly gatekeeper's optimal fee structure under the premise that sellers can charge two prices: one price is for subscribers, and the other is for non-subscribers. The gatekeeper's optimal fee structure attains the social optimal allocation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)9-14
Number of pages6
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume80
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003 Jul 1
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Advertising
  • Information gatekeeper
  • Price discrimination
  • Price search

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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