Abstract
We modify W. Vickrey's (1961, J. Finance 16, 8-37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D82.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 572-584 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 101 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2001 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Dominant strategy
- Double auction
- Efficiency
- Multilateral bargaining
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics