Abstract
We modify W. Vickrey's (1961, J. Finance 16, 8-37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D82.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 572-584 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 101 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2001 |
Keywords
- Dominant strategy
- Double auction
- Efficiency
- Multilateral bargaining
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The modified Vickrey double auction'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
Cite this
Yoon, K. (2001). The modified Vickrey double auction. Journal of Economic Theory, 101(2), 572-584. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2736