The modified Vickrey double auction

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We modify W. Vickrey's (1961, J. Finance 16, 8-37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D82.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)572-584
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume101
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2001

Keywords

  • Dominant strategy
  • Double auction
  • Efficiency
  • Multilateral bargaining

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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