Abstract
We modify W. Vickrey's (1961, J. Finance 16, 8-37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D82.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 572-584 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 101 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2001 Dec 1 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Keywords
- Dominant strategy
- Double auction
- Efficiency
- Multilateral bargaining
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
The modified Vickrey double auction. / Yoon, Kiho.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 101, No. 2, 01.12.2001, p. 572-584.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The modified Vickrey double auction
AU - Yoon, Kiho
PY - 2001/12/1
Y1 - 2001/12/1
N2 - We modify W. Vickrey's (1961, J. Finance 16, 8-37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D82.
AB - We modify W. Vickrey's (1961, J. Finance 16, 8-37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D82.
KW - Dominant strategy
KW - Double auction
KW - Efficiency
KW - Multilateral bargaining
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0035700552&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0035700552&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1006/jeth.2000.2736
DO - 10.1006/jeth.2000.2736
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0035700552
VL - 101
SP - 572
EP - 584
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
SN - 0022-0531
IS - 2
ER -