The modified Vickrey double auction

Kiho Yoon

doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2736

The modified Vickrey double auction

Kiho Yoon

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We modify W. Vickrey's (1961, J. Finance 16, 8-37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D82.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	572-584
Number of pages	13
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	101
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2736
Publication status	Published - 2001
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Dominant strategy
Double auction
Efficiency
Multilateral bargaining

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1006/jeth.2000.2736

Cite this

@article{ad3f6cc3b35c492c8e461330966a3a0a,

title = "The modified Vickrey double auction",

abstract = "We modify W. Vickrey's (1961, J. Finance 16, 8-37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D82.",

keywords = "Dominant strategy, Double auction, Efficiency, Multilateral bargaining",

author = "Kiho Yoon",

year = "2001",

doi = "10.1006/jeth.2000.2736",

language = "English",

volume = "101",

pages = "572--584",

journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",

issn = "0022-0531",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The modified Vickrey double auction

AU - Yoon, Kiho

PY - 2001

Y1 - 2001

N2 - We modify W. Vickrey's (1961, J. Finance 16, 8-37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D82.

AB - We modify W. Vickrey's (1961, J. Finance 16, 8-37) mechanism for call markets by introducing the participation stage and study the efficiency properties of the modified mechanism. We provide sufficient conditions under which the modified Vickrey double auction achieves full efficiency. In addition, we prove that the modified Vickrey double auction achieves asymptotic efficiency even when full efficiency cannot be achieved. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D44, D82.

KW - Dominant strategy

KW - Double auction

KW - Efficiency

KW - Multilateral bargaining

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0035700552&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0035700552&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1006/jeth.2000.2736

DO - 10.1006/jeth.2000.2736

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0035700552

VL - 101

SP - 572

EP - 584

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

IS - 2

ER -

The modified Vickrey double auction

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this