The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

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Abstract

This paper introduces the participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, which satisfies both ex-ante budget balance and interim individual rationality. We bound the efficiency loss of this mechanism by a parameter that captures the structure of marginal contributions to the social welfare. We then apply the theory to quite general multiple unit double auction problems to show that the participatory VCG mechanism achieves asymptotic efficiency.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)324-336
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume44
Issue number3-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008 Feb 1

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Keywords

  • Asymptotic efficiency
  • Double auction
  • Participation fees
  • Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics

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