When and how can advocacy groups promote new technologies? Conditions and strategies for effectiveness

Sung Eun Kim, Johannes Urpelainen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Abstract When and how can advocacy groups influence the diffusion of new technologies, such as wind power? We examine the relationship between two different strategies that advocacy groups can adopt: political lobbying and campaigns aimed at potential end users of the new technology. Our game-theoretic analysis shows that without the opportunity to engage in political lobbying, end user campaigns by an advocacy group have the counterproductive effect of reducing the government's incentive to subsidise the new technology. Instead of supporting the advocacy group's campaigning, the government free rides on the social movement's campaigning efforts. While political lobbying cannot prevent free riding, it increases the government's incentive to subsidise the new technology, and thus increases the advocacy group's payoff. These findings suggest that advocacy groups can promote technology diffusion if they can effectively deploy a dual strategy of political lobbying and end user campaigning.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)259-293
Number of pages35
JournalJournal of Public Policy
Volume33
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Dec 1
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

advocacy
lobbying
new technology
Group
incentive
campaign
technology diffusion
social movement
wind power

Keywords

  • end user campaign
  • Key words advocacy groups
  • political lobbying
  • technology diffusion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Public Administration
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

Cite this

When and how can advocacy groups promote new technologies? Conditions and strategies for effectiveness. / Kim, Sung Eun; Urpelainen, Johannes.

In: Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 33, No. 3, 01.12.2013, p. 259-293.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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