Work disincentive perception and welfare state attitudes: Survey experiment in South Korea

Sijeong Lim, Seiki Tanaka

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Scholars and policymakers have long examined whether and to what extent public income transfer programs create work disincentives. Less explored are the patterns and mechanisms through which perceived work disincentives shape public attitudes toward such programs. The present article bridges this gap by examining how individuals' exposure to a moral hazard discourse affects their support for an income transfer program. Our original survey experiment in South Korea finds that the effect of an identically worded piece of moral hazard information plays out differently depending on the eligibility criteria of the program in question (means-tested vs. universal) and the economic status of the respondents. The findings have significant implications for understanding the support base for the welfare state in the context of resurging interest in basic/guaranteed income.

Original languageEnglish
JournalGovernance
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Jan 1

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South Korea
welfare state
experiment
basic income
income
Experiment
Welfare state
Attitude survey
discourse
economics
Moral hazard
Income transfers

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Public Administration
  • Marketing

Cite this

Work disincentive perception and welfare state attitudes : Survey experiment in South Korea. / Lim, Sijeong; Tanaka, Seiki.

In: Governance, 01.01.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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